Foresight's 20/20

I'm not saying I agree with the Feingold or the French all the time. They can be pretty big douchebags themselves. Today I came across these pre-war statements and combined with my thinking about things, such as, the iraq in the last week it was pretty bitter tonic. This in the face of claims I hear all the time that everyone was following the same mistaken intelligence reports, or how noone could have known what would have happened in this fucking mess. Or how the dems bitch about the war solely for political gain, Bush talking about how the media ruins any rosy picture he tries to put out there, gimme a fucking break. It's terrible and a lot of people called that shit. But we're in break it-bought it mode now, and in the face what has been such a sorry downward spiral it's really hard to accept that some people still feel we have the best people in the top jobs. Honestly, I know jackshit about international politics or actual military strategy, but I don't know much about pitching a fastball or fixing a motorcycle either. But some people do. Some people do.

Both in terms of the justifications for an invasion and in terms of the mission and the plan for the invasion, Mr. President, the Administration's arguments just don't add up. They don't add up to a coherent basis for a new major war in the middle of our current challenging fight against the terrorism of al Qaeda and related organizations. Therefore, I cannot support the resolution for the use of force before us.

I associate myself with the concerns eloquently raised by Senator Kennedy and Senator Byrd and others that this could well represent a disturbing change in our overall foreign and military policy. This includes grave concerns about what such a preemption-plus policy will do to our relationship with our allies, to our national security, and to the cause of world peace in so many regions of the world, where such a doctrine could trigger very dangerous actions with really very minimal justification.

But, Mr. President, I am increasingly troubled by the seemingly shifting justifications for an invasion at this time. My colleagues, I'm not suggesting there has to be only one justification for such a dramatic action. But when the Administration moves back and forth from one argument to another, I think it undercuts the credibility of the case and the belief in its urgency. I believe that this practice of shifting justifications has much to do with the troubling phenomenon of many Americans questioning the Administration's motives in insisting on action at this particular time.

What am I talking about? I'm talking about the spectacle of the President and senior Administration officials citing a purported connection to al Qaeda one day, weapons of mass destruction the next day, Saddam Hussein's treatment of his own people on another day, and then on some days the issue of Kuwaiti prisoners of war.

I am especially troubled by these shifting justifications because I and most Americans strongly support the President on the use of force in response to the attacks on September 11, 2001. I voted for Senate Joint Resolution 23, the use of force resolution, to go after al Qaeda and the Taliban and those associated with the tragedies of September 11. And I strongly support military actions pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution 23.

But the relentless attempt to link 9-11 and the issue of Iraq has been disappointing to me for months, culminating in the President's singularly unpersuasive attempt in Cincinnati to interweave 9-11 and Iraq, to make the American people believe that there are no important differences between the perpetrators of 9-11 and Iraq.

Statement of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold on Opposing the Resolution Authorizing the Use of Force Against Iraq From the Senate Floor - October 9, 2002

A second reason for the reluctance of the French people is that Iraq is not viewed as an immediate threat. Thanks to the determination of President Bush and the international community - and to the inspections that destroyed more armaments between 1991 and 1998 than did the Persian Gulf war itself, and which have now been reinforced with stronger means and bigger teams - Saddam Hussein is in a box. And the box has been closed with the inspectors in it.

Europeans consider North Korea a greater threat. Imagine what a sense of security we all would feel if, as in Iraq, 100 inspectors were proceeding with unimpeded inspections throughout North Korea, including the president's palaces.

A third reason for the cautious mood relates to the consequences of a war in Iraq. We see Iraq as a very complex country, with many different ethnic groups, a tradition of violence and no experience of democracy. You can't create democracy with bombs - in Iraq, it would require time, a strong presence and a strong committment.

We also worry about the region - considering that no peace process is at work for the moment in the Middle East, that none of the great powers seem able to foster one, and that a war in Iraq could result in more frustration and bitterness in the Arab and Muslim worlds.

People in France and more broadly in Europe fear that a military intervention could fuel extremism and encourage Qaeda recruitment. A war could weaken the indispensable international coalition against terrorism and worsen the threat of Islamic terrorism.

The inspections should be pursued and strengthened, and Saddam Hussein must be made to cooperate actively. War must remain the very last option.

Thank you very much.

Embassy of France in the United States - February 14, 2003

But then I glance back at a great uncyclopedia page on redundancy, which is uncyclopedia's entry on redundancy that uncyclopedia created to discuss the topic of redundancy, itself written in a repetitive way that states the same ideas over and over, and once more again, restating its definition of redundancy ad infinitum, and I find it amusingly hilarious that I can still laugh.

Here's the link.